Classical Utilitarianism
The Utilitarian movement began in the 18th and 19th century with the writings of two philosophers; Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. In both of their philosophies, when we think about doing an action, we have to measure the consequences for all people involved. Bentham and Mill both realized that we are more than isolated beings, so when we are acting ethically, we have to look at everyone affected. Otherwise, we are simply being selfish and not looking at the entire consequence of an action. It is the fact that it focuses on all people involved, not just on the self, which most clearly separates Utilitarianism from Ethical Egoism.
In Utilitarianism, the standard we ought to always use when evaluating an action is the amount of pleasure and pain the action causes for everyone affected. The action that maximizes overall happiness is the most ethical action to perform. However, Bentham and Mill define and measure happiness in two different ways.
Bentham’s Utilitarian Standard
Bentham thought we could measure the total amount of pleasure (or pain) using seven different criteria: “1st. Its intensity. 2nd. Its duration. 3rd. Its certainty. 4th. Its proximity…. 5th. Its productiveness. 6th. Its purity…. 7th. Its extent” (Bentham 716-717). Intensity refers to how powerful the feeling is, duration refers to how long the feeling will last, certainty refers to the odds that the pleasure will occur, productivity refers to likelihood that it will produce similar feelings, purity refers to the avoidance of any opposite feelings, and extent refers to the number of people affected.
To apply Bentham’s standard, one simply uses a calculus of, say, 1-10 and rates each alternative action according to each criterion above. For example, let’s say that someone invites you to a party in Towers. If you go to the party, it would be a 9 in intensity (because it’s a pretty awesome party) and a 5 in duration as the party only lasts a couple of hours. It gets a 9 for certainty because you are told the party is pretty good (and you have no reason to doubt the word of this person) and a 10 for proximity because you are going to the party right now. It gets 2 for productivity because once the pleasure is done at the party, it is done and won’t really create any more pleasures of a similar type. It also gets a 3 for purity as, if you drink too much, if you fail to study, or if you are caught drinking (assuming you are underage) it will cause pain in the future, so it isn’t a very pure pleasure. It gets a 5 on extent as the party is about average in size. The total amount of pleasure created is 43. If you don’t go to the party, it would be a 1 for intensity as the pleasure created is not intense as it is just the status quo, but gets a 9 on duration as the status quo will last a lot longer. It gets a 9 for certainty as the situation isn’t likely to change and a 10 for proximity as it is happening right now. It gets an 8 for productivity because it will create similar pleasures and gets an 8 also for purity as it will be free of pain, except for the pain created by me not going to the party. Finally, it only gets 1 for extent as it only affects one person. The total for this choice is 46. From these numbers, the ethical choice would be not to go to the party.
It is important to remember that these numbers are subjective and someone may give any one of those criteria a different number. Once you have found the totals for each consequence, the one that creates the most happiness (the most pleasure and/or the least pain) for everyone involved is the most ethical thing to do.
Mill’s Utilitarian Standard
John Stuart Mill took a slightly different approach to calculating pleasure and pain. For Mill, we cannot simply focus on the quantity of the pleasure produced, for we have to measure the quality of each type of pleasure (and pain) as well. Insisting that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Mill 897), Mill argues that human beings should aim for “higher” pleasures which allow us to achieve more overall happiness in the long term, even if that forces us to sacrifice purely quantitative pleasures in the short term.
For example, lets say eating a four course meal created a net gain of happiness of 8, while choosing to skip that meal to read Act III of “Hamlet” created a net gain of 6; Bentham would way that we ought to choose the four course meal. However, Mill would say that reading “Hamlet” is a qualitatively “higher” form of pleasure, and because of its higher quality, it should count for more than the four course meal (if we think it is roughly twice as valuable in quality, then the net gain of reading Hamlet would increase from 6 to 12). As a general rule, Mill believed that ‘intellectual’ pleasures (reading, seeing a play, writing poetry, etc.) produced more qualitative value than ‘physical’ pleasures (eating, sleeping, and exercise).
Rationale for Maximizing Overall Happiness
The reason that Bentham and Mill think maximizing overall happiness is the appropriate standard for judging which actions are best is threefold. First, they believe that by nature all human beings are driven towards happiness, and that ethics should conform to and support our natures. As animals we are naturally driven to try to increase our pleasure and decrease our pain. Second, happiness and pleasure are also very practical standards to use when judging an action, since everyone agrees that happiness is worth seeking (whereas not everyone agrees about more abstract moral rules). Finally, they believe that no person should count more than any other from an ethical point of view. Although maximizing overall happiness sometimes forces us to sacrifice our individual goods somewhat, humanity in general will be much better off if we follow the utilitarian standard.
Bentham, Jeremy. “Principles of Legislation.” Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy. Ed. Steven M. Cahn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 711-730.
Mill, John Stuart. “Utilitarianism.” Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy. Ed. Steven M. Cahn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 893-927.